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Background
The	 European	 Network	 of	 Transmission	 System	 Operators	
for	 Electricity	 (ENTSO-E)	 identified	 in	 the	 latest	 Ten	 Year	
Network	Development	Plan	that	€104	billion	investments	are	
required	in	the	next	ten	years	in	projects	of	pan-European	sig-







investments	 at	 the	 lowest	 cost	of	 capital.	All	national	 regula-
tory	regimes	which	frame	the	behavior	of	EU	TSOs	should	be	






structures,	 with	 TSOs	 operating	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 regulatory	
borders	and	making	the	national	regulatory	frames	interact.	
It	 then	appears	 essential	 to	 study	 the	potential	 consequences	
and	interactions	of	national	regulatory	choices	with	regard	to	
network	investments	for	the	development	of	the	pan-European	
market.	 We	 consequently	 address	 five	 major	 EU	 regulatory	
frameworks	 in	Belgium,	France,	Great	Britain,	Germany	and	
the	Netherlands.	They	are	already	connected	within	a	common	
regional	 (North-West)	 market	 and	 host	 more	 than	 half	 of	
the	EU	electricity	generation.	We	analyze	and	compare	 them	
through	a	set	of	theoretical	and	empirical	principles	to	identify	





Economic properties of regulatory regimes
Joskow	(2008)	states	that:	“the primary goal of regulation in the 
public interest is to stimulate the regulated firm to produce output 
efficiently from cost and quality (including reliability) perspectives, 
to price the associated services efficiently, and to achieve these 
goals consistent with satisfying a break-even or budget-balance 
constraint for the regulated firm that allows the firm to covered its 
costs of providing service while restraining its ability to exercise its 
market power to exploit consumers by charging excessive prices”.





of	different	 regulatory	 instruments	on	 the	 level	of	 risk	borne	
by	 the	operator	and	what	 their	consequences	are	 in	 terms	of	
investments	 and	financeability.	Finally,	 the	 regulatory	 regime	








Comparing national regulatory regimes; 
assessing their economic properties












1.	 The scope of the revenue cap,	which	 represents	how	 the	
different	types	of	costs	are	integrated	in	the	revenue	cap,	
or	are	treated	separately	through	other	specific	efficiency	
specifications,	 or	 are	 not	 incentivized	 at	 all	 (building 
blocks vs. TOTEX).
2.	 Efficiency tools & targets	 should	 be	 defined	 in	 order	 to	
balance	incentives	for	cost	reduction	with	transfer	of	effi-
ciency	gains	to	final	users.	This	could	be	done	using	spe-
cific	tools	to	assess	relative	efficiencies (benchmarking vs. 
internal efficiency audit) 
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Analyzing	 the	 TSO	 regulatory	 regimes	 in	 Germany	 (period	
2014-2018),	France	(period	2013-2016),	Belgium	(period	2012-
2015),	the	Netherlands	(period	2014-2016)	and	Great-Britain	
(period	2013-2021)	with	 regard	 to	 these	 characteristics	 leads	
to	a	classification	of	these	regimes	into	three	main	categories.	
Belgium and France use a “building blocks” approach.	 They	
treat	different	categories	of	costs	differently,	mainly	excluding	




ciency	 audits	 on	 the	 investment	 budgets	 (ex ante	 approval	










Germany and the Netherlands use a “TOTEX” approach.	They	






the	 building	 blocks	 regime.	 Moreover,	 both	 Germany	 and	
Result 1: Comparing the economic properties of five national regulatory regimes
The choice of a design option in a regulatory regime opens room to tensions or trade-offs between its basic economic properties. No 
regulatory regime can simultaneously reach the highest level of performance for each of these properties. Our figure below gives a 
simplified representation of such economic properties, with regard to the different trade-offs being observed. Some regulatory regimes 
are more favourable to investments and potential long term benefits for final users, hence favouring lower risks for the TSO and a higher 
financeability (e.g., France). However, such regimes only provide modest incentives for cost reduction and the transfer of efficiency gains 
to final users in the short term. In contrast, other regimes are focussing more on short term benefits for final users, using higher transfer 
of efficiency gains and strong incentives for cost reduction (e.g., the Netherlands). However such regimes are often conducive to TSO 
higher risks and lower financeability. The North-West national regulatory regimes show there a significant heterogeneity with regard to 
their economic trade-offs. 
Comparison of economic properties and trade-offs of the North-West regulatory designs
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The	Netherlands	favor	inter-TSO	benchmarking	as	a	key	tool	





Result 2: Target for a regulation harmonization at the regional level
In the new era we are in, the cost of capital and the financeability issues are key for the EU as a whole as well as individually for each TSO. 
If giving an absolute priority to cost reduction was an excellent idea in a period of low investment and low technology innovation (like 
GB did from 1990 to 2010), it is no more such a priority at times of massive investments and innovation. In Great Britain, after two decades 
of “lowering OPEX” and lowering tariffs, we might assume that the general level of efficiency should be quite fair today and the impact of 
further efficiency effort on the transmission tariff will only be smaller.
As a result, more harmonisation of regulation regimes at the North-West regional level should bring a more favourable environment for 
investments. A new balance between TSO investment risks and TSO efficiency incentives should be found to accommodate new targets 
as capital cost reduction and favourable financing structures. The existing regulatory regimes should start to decrease the risks borne 
by the TSOs, such as relying too much on benchmarking analysis with too limited data increases the TSO risks. Hence benchmarking 
might be combined with other efficiency tools and used more as an informative and a negotiation tool. More broadly incentive regula-
tion should conceive a set of mechanisms dealing with uncertainty and a continuing process of improvement of these mechanisms.  To 
maintain the network utilities’ financeability, a good equilibrium should also be found between short-term profit sharing and the allowed 
WACC. In some cases, remuneration of capital for investments should therefore be increased, efficiency targets should be moderated, and 
the scope or the tools of incentive regulation should be reviewed. The next figure illustrates a possible trajectory of regulatory conver-
gence for Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Great-Britain.
If this harmonisation target cannot be reached, under-investment might be expected (lowering the future quality of network services or 
missing the objectives of energy transition and EU internal market building). A higher cost of capital for network investment would also 
occur when network operators experience too much risk. It might increase the financeability issue and lead to further increasing the 
future network tariffs.
A regional harmonization target




an	 international	 benchmarking	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 additional	
regulatory	 risks	 for	 the	TSOs.	Of	 course	German	and	Dutch	
regulatory	regimes	present	variances	as	each	of	these	regimes	
implements	 the	 benchmarking	 tool	 differently,	 and	 the	 cost	










ment	 budget	 (IB)	 lowers	 the	 risks	 born	 by	 the	 TSOs	 as	 the	
investments	concerned	are	excluded	from	the	efficiency	targets	
for	one	or	two	regulatory	periods.
Great Britain represents an intermediary position	between	those	
two	types	of	regulatory	regimes.	First,	the	already	long	history	
of	British	 regulation	can	only	push	both	 risks	and	 incentives	
if	the	target	is	still	to	get	further	deep	cost	reduction.	Second,	
the	 British	 regime	 finally	 did	move	 to	 a	 TOTEX	 “approach”.	
This	 factor	 should	 also	 strengthen	 risk	 and	 incentives	 after	




Moreover,	 these	 targets	do	not	 touch	upon	the	assets	already	
integrated	in	the	RAB.	Finally,	the	British	regime	uses	a	“menu	
of	contracts”	where	the	TSO	chooses	its	preferred	combination	
of	 incentives	 and	 risks	 according	 to	 its	 managerial	 business	






while	 the	 Dutch	 and	 Belgian	 are	 the	 lowest	 (4.7%	 and	 4.3%	
respectively	with	a	hypothetical	notional	gearing	of	60%).	The	
allowed	capital	cost	in	France	and	in	Germany	is	mid-range.
Replacing existing regulatory regimes in 
their genuine national foundations…
The	heterogeneity	between	existing	national	regulatory	regimes	







regime	and	 the	particular	 specificities	of	 its	national	 founda-
tion	can	be	highlighted	in	four	key	points.	First,	the	investment	





of	 ensuring	 financeability	 and	minimizing	 the	 risks.	 Second,	
the	cost	of	capital	 experienced	by	 the	TSO	 in	 the	market	 for	
capital	should	influence	the	regulatory	choices	with	regard	to	




cost	reduction	will	be	 less	relevant	 for	 the	regulatory	regime.	
Fourth	and	lastly,	all	regulatory	choices	are	made	with	an	eye	
on	the	impact	on	the	electricity	final	bill.
… while they become more regional and 
integrated with each other
The	national	isolated	foundations	in	which	regulatory	regimes	
have	 developed	 are	 no	 longer	 the	 only	 horizon.	 National	
regimes	 have	 been	 gradually	 influenced	 and	 remodeled	 by	 a	




that	 the	Third	Package	 and	 the	 Infrastructure	Package	made	
irreversible	 step	 toward	 an	 effective	 common	 EU	 regulatory	
frame.	 Furthermore,	 all	 the	 power	 transmission	 networks	
in	 the	North-West	 region	are	now	undertaken	 in	 a	 common	
regional	market	and	are	facing	similar	challenges	regarding	the	
need,	the	risks,	and	the	financeability	of	investments.
Toward a higher North-West harmonization 
of regulatory regimes
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The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the European Energy 
Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the European Commission. The 
Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory 
topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and policies.
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regional	market.	This	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 all	 the	 regulatory	
design	options,	all	parameters	or	revenue	components	should	
be	 exactly	 the	 same,	 but	 that	 the	 regulatory	 preferences	 and	
the	economic	properties	influencing	the	network	investments	
should	be	aligned	to	a	certain	extent.
